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Abstract
The question of ‘what is a mental disorder?’ is central to the philosophy of psychiatry, and has
crucial practical implications for psychiatric nosology. Rather than approaching the problem
in terms of abstractions, we review a series of exemplars – real-world examples of problematic
cases that emerged during work on and immediately after DSM-5, with the aim of developing
practical guidelines for addressing future proposals. We consider cases where (1) there is harm
but no clear dysfunction, (2) there is dysfunction but no clear harm, and (3) there is possible
dysfunction and/or harm, but this is controversial for various reasons. We found no specific
criteria to determine whether future proposals for new entities should be accepted or rejected;
any such proposal will need to be assessed on its particular merits, using practical judgment.
Nevertheless, several suggestions for the field emerged. First, while harm is useful for defining
mental disorder, some proposed entities may require careful consideration of individual v.
societal harm, as well as of societal accommodation. Second, while dysfunction is useful for
defining mental disorder, the field would benefit from more sharply defined indicators of dys-
function. Third, it would be useful to incorporate evidence of diagnostic validity and clinical
utility into the definition of mental disorder, and to further clarify the type and extent of data
needed to support such judgments.
Introduction
The question of ‘what is a mental disorder?’ is foundational in philosophy of psychiatry, and
also has enormous practical importance for clinicians and patients. This question has therefore
been addressed in successive revisions of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Given ongoing work on the revision of
DSM-5, it is timely to ask this question again.
Many previous attempts have applied a conceptual approach to the definition of mental
disorder. These have produced limited progress, particularly in assisting with decisions
about specific conditions. Thus, it may be useful to try a different approach to this critical
problem. Rather than focusing on abstractions, we review a series of exemplars – real-world
examples of problematic cases that emerged during work on and immediately after DSM-5.
From these cases, we hoped to extract practical guidelines for considering future proposals
for the inclusion of entities in the nosology.
What is a mental disorder?
The question of ‘what is a mental disorder’, is crucial, in part, because the real possibility exists
of erroneously classifying various kinds of social deviance or behavioral variation as ‘disorder’,
when they are better conceptualized using other categories, such as ‘non-pathological
individual differences’, ‘lifestyle choice’, or ‘crime’. A paradigmatic example from DSM is
that of homosexuality, which was conceptualized in DSM-I as a disorder, (American
Psychiatric Association, 1952) but by DSM-5 was no longer mentioned (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013; Drescher, 2015).
Many authors have emphasized that what counts as a disease or disorder changes over time
and across place, and have accused medicine and psychiatry of failing to recognize how idioms
of distress are shaped by culture (Kirmayer, 2005; Kleinman, 1988). Others have accused the
DSM of over-medicalizing (Frances, 2014; Horwitz, 2007; Szasz, 2007). These criticisms are
driven by disagreements about the advantages and disadvantages of the medicalization of
putative mental conditions. Central to these debates is the degree to which our disorders
can be best understood as independent biological entities (naturalism/objectivism) or value-
laden social constructs (normativism/constructivism) (Agich, 1983; Boorse, 1975; Fulford,
2001; Nordenfelt, 2007; Sadler, 2005; Stein, 2008; Zachar & Kendler, 2017).
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Prior proposals have attempted to move beyond the polarities
of naturalism and constructivism. Zachar suggested that mental
disorders are ‘practical kinds’ (Zachar, 2002), shifting the issue
from whether disorder categories reference scientific entities, to
how effectively they facilitate particular scientific or clinical
goals (Zachar & Kendler, 2017). In influential work, Wakefield
defined mental disorders as ‘harmful dysfunctions’, and depicted
dysfunction in evolutionary terms (Wakefield, 1992).
A strong form of realism holds that, just as the periodic table
depicts the properties of molecular entities, so a medical or psy-
chiatric nosology can carve nature at its joints – as a series of ‘nat-
ural kinds’ (Kendler, 2016; Stein, 2008). Softer forms of realism,
likely more appropriate for conceptualizing mental disorders,
regard exemplars like biological species as more appropriate for
psychiatric disorders as the boundaries between different species
are fuzzy, and not amenable to depiction in tabular format
(Kendler, 2016; Stein, 2008).
We find aspects of both pragmatic approaches and Wakefield’s
characterization helpful, and use them as a framework for organ-
izing our exemplars. More specifically, in reviewing real-world
cases relevant to DSM-5 we will rely on the notions of ‘harm’
and of ‘dysfunction’. Harm may be indexed by the presence of
distress and impairment, while dysfunction may be inferred
when psychobiological mechanisms produce symptoms and asso-
ciated harm. Nevertheless, as our exemplars will demonstrate,
judgments about harm and dysfunction entail a range of add-
itional complex considerations.
DSM definitions of mental disorder
DSM has responded to these debates in its definitions of mental
disorders. Thus DSM-III emphasizes, for example, that clinicians
should not misclassify or label a cultural expression of distress or
political deviance as a disease (American Psychiatric Association,
1980). Subsequent editions of DSM have emphasized that the
boundaries of mental disorders are fuzzy (Table 1) (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000, 2013).
During the development of DSM-5, along with others, we
attempted to further clarify the DSM criteria for a mental disorder
(Table 2) (Stein et al., 2010). While our proposal differs modestly
from the later DSM-5 wording (Table 3), three differences are
relevant here. First, while the DSM-5 definition refers to dysfunc-
tion in ‘psychological, biological, or developmental processes,’ we
prefer ‘psychobiological’, to emphasize that psychology and biol-
ogy are intertwined constructs that encompass development, as
well as other life-course constructs.
Second, our proposal suggested that the consequences of a
mental disorder are clinically significant distress or disability
(B). The DSM-5 wording indicates that mental disorders are usu-
ally associated with significant distress or impairment. The word
‘usually’ may be technically accurate, in that on rare occasions, a
Table 1. DSM-IV definition of mental disorder
Features
A
A clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or
pattern that occurs in an individual.
B
Associated with present distress (e.g. a painful symptom) or
disability (i.e. impairment in one or more important areas of
functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering
death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom.
C
Must not be merely an expectable and culturally sanctioned
response to a particular event (e.g. the death of a loved one).
D
A manifestation of behavioral, psychological, or biological
dysfunction in the individual.
E
Neither deviant behavior (e.g. political, religious, or sexual) nor
conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society
are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a
symptom of a dysfunction in the individual.
Other considerations
F
No definition adequately specifies precise boundaries for the
concept of ‘mental disorder’.
G
The concept of mental disorder (like many other concepts in
medicine and science) lacks a consistent operational definition
that covers all situations.
Table 2. DSM-V proposal for the definition of mental/psychiatric disorder
Features
A
A behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in
an individual
B
The consequences of which are clinically significant distresses
(e.g. a painful symptom), or disability (i.e. impairment in one or
more important areas of functioning)
C
Must not be merely an expectable response to common stressors
and losses (e.g. the loss of a loved one) or a culturally sanctioned
response to a particular event (e.g. trance states in religious
rituals)
D
That reflects an underlying psychobiological dysfunction.
E
That is not primarily a result of social deviance or conflicts with
society
Other considerations
F That has diagnostic validity on the basis of various diagnostic
validators (e.g. prognostic significance, psychobiological
disruption, response to treatment)
G
That has clinical utility (e.g. contributes to better
conceptualization of diagnoses, or to better assessment and
treatment)
H
No definition perfectly specifies precise boundaries for the
concept of either ‘medical disorder’ or ‘mental/psychiatric
disorder’
I Diagnostic validators and clinical utility should help to
differentiate a disorder from diagnostic ‘nearest neighbors’
J When considering whether to add a mental/psychiatric condition
to the nomenclature or delete a mental/psychiatric condition
from the nomenclature, potential benefits (e.g. provide better
patient care, stimulate new research) should outweigh potential
harms (e.g. hurt particular individuals, be subject to misuse)
Table 3. DSM-5 definition of mental disorder
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant
disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior
that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or development
processes underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually
associated with significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or
other important activities. An expectable or culturally approved response
to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a
mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior (e.g. political, religious, or
sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society
are not mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict results from a
dysfunction in the individual, as described above.
2 Dan J. Stein et al.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291721001185
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 105.233.95.165, on 19 Apr 2021 at 14:54:59, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
mental disorder is listed in DSM-5, and there is no ‘clinical criter-
ion’ (First & Wakefield, 2013). However, given that psychiatric
symptoms are often on a continuum with normality, the clinical
criterion is one key way of providing a relatively valid and reliable
marker of underlying dysfunction, so lessening the risk of false
positives and over-medicalization (Cooper, 2013). Other ways in
which clinical criteria can validly and reliably point to underlying
dysfunction include descriptions of symptom severity, excessive-
ness, frequency, and duration (First & Wakefield, 2013).
Third, our proposal made reference to considerations of diag-
nostic validity and clinical utility. This explicitly emphasizes that
decisions about proposals for new entities must address empirical
data. Certainly, data on diagnostic validity and clinical utility of
proposed entities were carefully assessed during the DSM-5 revi-
sion process.
Examining different exemplars
We now turn to a number of test-cases that emerged during
DSM-5. While conceptual work is crucial, it is important to
examine its conclusions in the context of specific empirical exam-
ples, which may then produce greater clarity on the underlying
conceptual issues.
We explore, in turn, several different types of cases, categorized
along the following lines: (1) entities associated with harm, but for
which there is limited evidence of underlying dysfunction, (2)
entities involving dysfunction but without strong evidence that
they produce harm, and (3) entities involving possible harm
and dysfunction, and thus possibly indicative of a disorder, but
which are controversial for various reasons. While the third
category deals explicitly with controversial cases, controversy is
present in all three categories.
Harm but no clear psychobiological dysfunction
A number of conditions are associated with harm to individuals
and/or society, but are not considered disorders because they
lack evidence of underlying psychobiological dysfunction.
Entities that fall under this rubric include unwanted physical,
mental, or behavioral changes (e.g. those that accompany
aging), more enduring traits that entail suffering or produce nega-
tive impacts but are not considered disorders (e.g. laziness), and
behavior that is more appropriately classified as culturally or
socially deviant rather than as a mental disorder (e.g. racism).
The appropriate responses to distress or impairment associated
with these entities would generally be regarded as emanating
from moral, cultural, or social domains, rather than from the
domain of health. Closer examination of specific exemplars sug-
gests, however, that judgments of whether or not an entity should
be included in the nosology reflect a number of different consid-
erations (Table 4).
Aging is associated with a range of negative sequelae.
Furthermore, there is a growing understanding of the specific psy-
chobiological mechanisms that lead to symptoms associated with
aging and these harms, bolstering the claim that aging involves
dysfunction (De Grey, 2007). That said, a range of causal mechan-
isms presumably underly the spectrum of aging from premature
aging (e.g. progeria) to typical senescence. Indeed, a view that
emphasizes the normality of aging may concede that physicians
counsel individuals on a range of measures to sustain health
Table 4. Key considerations regarding the inclusion of putative entities in the nosology
Typology of disorders Exemplars Key considerations
Harm but no clear psychobiological
dysfunction
Aging Existence, efficacy, and cost-efficiency of health
interventions
Bereavement exclusion criterion Internal consistency of criteria and constructs in the
nosology
Racism Relevance of social and cultural values and interventions
Laziness/apathy, gluttony/hyperphagia,
acquisitiveness/hoarding, etc.
Presence of associated features, including severity, that
indicate dysfunction
Psychobiological dysfunction but no clear
harm
Auditory hallucinations Extent of distress and impairment indicative of harm
ASD Potential for social accommodation to diminish harm
GD Weighing the advantages/disadvantages of medicalization.
Possible harm and psychobiological
dysfunction but controversial
Medicalization concerns
Compulsive sexual behavior disorder,
Gaming disorder
Assessment of degree of loss of control, and associated
impairment
Overdiagnosis concerns APS Sufficient data to assess advantages/disadvantages of
health interventions
Suicidal behavior Self-harming behavior is not necessarily indicative of a
mental disorder
Pragmatic concerns Simple type schizophrenia Rare and poorly researched entities may be disorders, but
may not deserve inclusion in the nosology
PCD Maintaining societal trust in the integrity of psychiatric
diagnosis
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and curb aging but call into question the inclusion of mild neu-
rocognitive disorder in DSM-5. The concern is that this risks
pathologizing minor forgetfulness associated with the aging pro-
cess, particularly given the lack of treatment and the potentially
harmful effects of receiving such a diagnosis (Rattan, 2014).
That said, the more future medical interventions for mild neuro-
cognitive disorder target mechanisms relevant to premature aging,
and are shown efficacious and cost-effective, the more useful such
a diagnosis will, arguably, be. Thus, judgments about the inclu-
sion of entities in the nosology may, in part, reflect the existence,
efficacy, and cost-efficiency of health interventions.
Time-limited and non-incapacitating anxiety associated with
threat (e.g. a possible job loss), and suffering associated with
loss (e.g. death of a parent), may be experienced as unwelcome,
and clinicians may play a useful role in helping to alleviate
them. Nevertheless, anxiety and sadness in the face of threat
and loss are generally considered to be appropriate, rather than
dysfunctional, responses. During the development of DSM-5,
there was considerable debate about the removal of the bereave-
ment exclusion criteria from the diagnosis of major depression
(Zachar, First, & Kendler, 2017). The removal of this clause is
consistent with the fact that depressions that are precipitated by
a range of other common stressors (e.g. romantic rejection; ser-
ious medical problems) were not excluded. While critics argued
that this decision reflected over-medicalization, a counter-
argument is that it is important to ensure that diagnostic criteria
allow appropriate diagnosis and treatment of depression in the
context of bereavement (Prigerson, Boelen, Xu, Smith, &
Maciejewski, 2021). Thus, judgments about thresholds for a puta-
tive disorder in the nosology may require consideration of epi-
stemic values such as the internal consistency of criteria.
Racism is a phenomenon that has been associatedwith great harm
and suffering (Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia, 2014).
While extreme racism may be a symptom of psychopathology, and
there is some evidence of an association between, for example, racism
and certain personality types (Adorno, 1969), there is little evidence
that racism, in general, is the result of underlying psychobiological
dysfunction. Rather, there is relatively widespread consensus that
racist beliefs and behavior are largely a product of socialization and
culture. We would therefore argue that racism is not a disorder; it
is a phenomenon that, while sanctioned in some cultures in the
past, is now a form of social deviance that should be addressed by a
range of different social and educational interventions. Thus, judg-
ments about the inclusion of an entity in the nosology may require
rigorous reflection on cultural and social values.
Similar logic would hold for a range of other socially deviant
or problematic behaviors (Aristotle, 1985), including those redo-
lent of the seven deadly sins of laziness, gluttony, acquisitiveness,
aggression, lust, jealousy, and pride. Prima facie, these are more
appropriately understood and responded to in moral or socio-
cultural terms rather than with health interventions. That said,
psychotherapy may usefully target such behaviors or traits, and
public health may usefully advocate for healthy eating and sexual
behaviors. Furthermore, this matter is complicated by the fact that
when clearly excessive, such traits can point to underlying psy-
chobiological dysfunction; indeed, symptoms such as apathy,
hyperphagia, hoarding, violence, hypersexuality, obsessional jeal-
ousy, and grandiosity may be indicative of a psychiatric disorder,
and are appropriately listed in the DSM-5 glossary. Thus, judg-
ments about the inclusion of a disorder in the nosology are
based, in part, on evidence of clear excessiveness of behaviors/
traits, and associated features that point to dysfunction.
Psychobiological dysfunction but no clear harm
In this category, we include various conditions for which there is
some evidence of underlying psychobiological dysfunction, even if
this is not fully understood. Conditions in this category may have
been regarded as harmful, in the sense of disadvantageous, or
socially deviant, in the past, but this view has been contested
due to social change. While conditions in this category may
point to differences rather than disorder, individuals with these
conditions may still experience disadvantage and suffering. It
may therefore be crucial to ensure support and treatment for
those who seek it. Again, a closer examination of specific exem-
plars suggests that judgments of whether or not an entity should
be included in the nosology reflect a number of different consid-
erations (Table 4).
The notion of disability has been extensively challenged by
rights-based advocacy groups and organizations that have focused
on promoting inclusivity, equality, and respect (Charlton, 1998).
A paradigmatic example is deafness, which although not a psychi-
atric entity, is nevertheless useful as a point of departure for fur-
ther discussion of analogous behavioral conditions where the
presence of harm is contested. Deafness is the result of underlying
alterations in structures and mechanisms of hearing, consistent
with dysfunction. Moreover, given the challenges of participating
in a hearing society, deafness has been widely viewed as disadvan-
tageous, and characterized as a medical condition. However, this
has been challenged by the view that deafness itself is not intrin-
sically harmful; rather, it is societal responses, or lack of response
in terms of ensuring adequate accommodation, that produces
harm. A view of deafness as a disability has been replaced with
a view of deafness as a cultural identity (Padden & Humphries,
2005). This identity is referred to as Deaf, rather than deaf,
which refers simply to hearing loss. While there have been rare,
but controversial, cases of Deaf parents wishing to utilize preim-
plantation genetic diagnosis to select for deafness, many members
of the Deaf community, given the choice of having children with
or without hearing, opt for the former (Camporesi, 2010; Wallis,
2020).
Deaf culture has some parallels with groups that are open
about their unusual psychological behaviors or traits, but who
argue that these are not associated with harm. It turns out, for
example, that hearing voice is prevalent in the general population,
and that these experiences may not necessarily be indicative of a
serious mental disorder (Maijer, Begemann, Palmen, Leucht, &
Sommer, 2018). In the absence of harm, it is difficult to argue
for the medicalization of such experiences, and there are now sup-
port groups for those with these experiences (Longden, 2017).
That said, hearing voices may be a symptom of a range of mental
disorders, other than psychotic disorders, and there is evidence
from community surveys that such symptoms are associated
with significant disability, which is unlikely to be simply a reflec-
tion of lack of social accommodation (Navarro-Mateu et al., 2017;
Pierre, 2010). Thus, judgments about whether or not an entity
should be included in the nosology require nuanced assessment
of the extent of harm, as reflected in distress and impairment.
Autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) which is associated with
alterations in structures and mechanisms underlying behavior
(Van Rooij et al., 2018), has traditionally been viewed as a harmful
condition. However, there is a contrary position, whichmay be par-
ticularly relevant to milder cases of ASD. In this view, the positive
attributes associated with ASD (e.g. high levels of creativity and
mathematical ability) are emphasized and neurodiversity is
4 Dan J. Stein et al.
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celebrated, shifting the onus onto neuro-typical society to accom-
modate neuro-atypical persons (Glannon, 2007). However, despite
the growing prevalence of persons with ASD who choose to see
themselves as situated on a spectrum of normal variation, there
are many individuals and families who seek health interventions
or advocate for more scientific research to cure or prevent ASD
(Walsh, Elsabbagh, Bolton, & Singh, 2011). These disagreements
are perhaps indicative of the heterogeneous and dimensional nature
of both ASD and its impact; in severe cases care rather than accom-
modation is required. Thus, judgments about whether or not an
entity should be included in the nosology require careful assessment
of the extent to which social accommodation is possible.
A similar set of issues emerges for gender identity disorder (GID)
or transsexualism,whichwere removedfromDSM-5andICD-11and
replaced by gender dysphoria (GD) and gender incongruence,
respectively. These lattercategories address cases inwhich there is sig-
nificant distress due to conflicts between assigned and identified gen-
der. In the case of GD, there is some preliminary evidence of
neuroanatomical differences between transgenderand cisgender per-
sons which may arguably indicate underlying dysfunction (Burke,
Manzouri, & Savic, 2017). Moreover, there is also some evidence of
harmfulness, for example, a high risk of suicide (Garcia-Vega,
Camero, Fernandez, & Villaverde, 2018). This could be sufficient
for inclusion in our third category, however, we mention GD here
because, despite the evidence that distress is intrinsic to the condition,
it has also been argued that this distress is a product of stigmatization
and social rejection. The shift from social rejection to acceptance of
homosexuality, has bolstered this argument for some. On the other
hand, from a clinical utility perspective, the inclusion of GD in the
nosology is precisely important for ensuring medical and psychiatric
care for individuals with this condition who request such care.
Judgments about whether or not an entity should be included in
thenosologymay require careful balancing of the advantages anddis-
advantages of medicalization (Parens, 2013).
Possible harm and psychobiological dysfunction, but
controversial
In the third category, we include conditions for which there is
some evidence of underlying psychobiological dysfunction and
actual or potential harm, but which are controversial for various
reasons. First, the controversy may be attributed to a lack of cer-
tainty about whether or not a condition does, in fact, reflect
underlying psychobiological dysfunction, or whether inclusion
would represent over-medicalization. Second, the controversy
could arise due to the fact that harm, in the sense of clinically sig-
nificant distress or impairment, may be present only as a risk,
which may not be actualized, so that inclusion of the condition
may lead to overdiagnosis. Concerns about medicalization and
overdiagnosis both reflect a critical stance towards the expansion
of disorder constructs (Hofmann, 2016). Third, a condition may
be indicative of disorder but considered controversial, in the
sense of inappropriate for inclusion in the nosology, due to vari-
ous pragmatic concerns. This could include a risk of misuse in
legal contexts or negative implications for public health. These
kinds of pragmatic considerations shift the focus from whether
or not a condition is a disorder to whether or not a particular dis-
order belongs in a diagnostic manual (Table 4).
Medicalization concerns
Compulsive sexual behavior disorder was rejected for DSM-5 but
is included in ICD-11 as an impulse control disorder (Grant &
Chamberlain, 2016). There is a growing evidence base on this dis-
order. Still, hypersexuality is not necessarily pathological, and
there is currently little direct evidence that those who present clin-
ically for the treatment of compulsive sexual behavior have under-
lying psychobiological dysfunction. Thus, such dysfunction needs
to be inferred on the basis of clinical criteria such as severity and
duration of symptoms (Kafka, 2010). As noted earlier, psychiatry
should be wary of medicalizing conditions redolent of the seven
sins, focusing rather on advocating for healthy sexual behavior.
At the same time, psychiatry clearly has a role when hypersexual-
ity reflects an underlying medical or psychiatric disorder, and it
may well have a role when symptoms are truly excessive and asso-
ciated with a great deal of distress and impairment. For example,
it is not clear whether a person who compulsively watches porn-
ography, but is able to limit viewing to the privacy of the home,
has a disorder. While personal relationships may be negatively
impacted, such a person can be described as functioning, as
long as there is control over the behavior. We would be more
inclined to regard a person who cannot limit viewing of pornog-
raphy to a particular time of day or place and feels compelled to
watch it while at work, with risk of job loss, as having a disorder.
Judgments about whether or not an entity should be included in
the nosology may require careful assessment of the degree of loss
of control, and related impairment, particularly in the case of
compulsive or addictive behaviors.
Internet gaming disorder was included in DSM-5 as a condi-
tion for further study, and gaming disorder is included as a men-
tal disorder in ICD-11 (Billieux, Flayelle, Rumpf, & Stein, 2019).
There is some evidence of underlying alterations in psychobio-
logical structures and mechanisms in gambling disorder, which
is included in both nosologies, but less evidence that this is the
case in gaming disorder. Behavioral addictions are controversial
partly because they raise questions as to whether underlying
alterations in structures or mechanisms are sufficient to explain
the behavior (which may be viewed as a lifestyle choice rather
than as a loss of control). Proposals for new behavioral addictions
such as gaming disorder also face the difficulty that there is sim-
ply less evidence for newly emergent conditions. Similarly, the
brain disease model of substance use disorders has been critiqued
(Hammer et al., 2013). Still, there is a strong argument that sub-
stance use disorders are mental disorders, with evidence of altera-
tions in a range of psychobiological processes that are associated
with loss of control, and that can be targeted by health
interventions.
Overdiagnosis concerns
Attenuated psychosis syndrome (APS), which is associated both
with evidence of psychobiological dysfunction and potential
harm in the case of conversion, was included in DSM-5 as a con-
dition for further study (Tsuang et al., 2013). APS elicits concerns
about overdiagnosis, mainly due to the possibility that interven-
tions for individuals who meet the criteria may cause harm
(Zachar, First, & Kendler, 2020). There are some parallels between
APS and other risk-syndromes such as hypercholesterolaemia or
hypertension. Once it was clear that high levels of cholesterol
were risky, these were defined as pathological. With the introduc-
tion of statins, and evidence that these agents lowered risks,
thresholds for diagnosis were lowered; with the introduction of
generic statins, and great cost-efficiencies, such thresholds were
further decreased. It is possible that an analogous perspective
may be useful in defining thresholds for anxiety disorders and
depression. However, in the case of APS, there are arguably
Psychological Medicine 5
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insufficient data demonstrating risk if untreated, as well as insuf-
ficient data demonstrating safety, efficacy, and cost-efficiency of
interventions. Moreover, medical risk-syndromes may differ
from the risk associated with a psychotic disorder due to the
high levels of stigmatization associated with the latter.
Nevertheless, it is possible that the issue of whether, and when,
to intervene in the case of evidence of psychiatric risk will become
increasingly pertinent given the potential for identifying predict-
ive biomarkers – for example, from molecular genetics research
(Palk, Dalvie, de Vries, Martin, & Stein, 2019).
Suicidal behavior disorder is included in DSM-5 as a condition
for further study. Clearly, it is important for clinicians to be aware
of suicidal behavior, and this is often an important target of treat-
ment. On the other hand, suicidal behavior may be due to a range
of different mental disorders, reflecting a range of different kinds
of dysfunction. Furthermore, suicidal behavior is not always asso-
ciated with a mental disorder; there is a compelling argument that
in particular medical circumstances, it is understandable and
appropriate for patients to make a decision to end their lives.
Suicide can also arise as a form of political protest or a culturally
sanctioned response to shame. Judgments about diagnostic valid-
ity may be complex, including consideration of a range of differ-
ent empirical data of varying quality. This point is also
exemplified by other entities included in DSM-5 as conditions
for further study, namely persistent complex bereavement dis-
order, depressive episodes with short-duration hypomania, caf-
feine use disorder, non-suicidal self-injury, and neurobehavioral
disorder associated with prenatal alcohol exposure (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Pragmatic concerns
Simple (type) schizophrenia (SS) or simple deteriorative disorder
has long been controversial (Serra-Mestres et al., 2000). It has not
been included in the nosology since DSM-III (although it was
included in DSM-IV as a condition for further study), and
while it was in ICD-10 it is not in ICD-11. There is indeed
some evidence that simple schizophrenia is a rare deteriorative
disorder characterized by nonspecific negative symptoms and an
absence of psychotic symptoms. However, while previous itera-
tions of DSM contained schizophrenia sub-types, these were
appropriately removed due to a lack of diagnostic validity and reli-
ability, and evidence that schizophrenia is a spectrum disorder
(Serra-Mestres et al., 2000; Whitwell, Bramham, & Moriarty,
2018). Nevertheless, the fact that there continue to be patients
who present with these kinds of deteriorative symptoms has
been used to support claims that the diagnosis remains relevant
(Whitwell et al., 2018). This exemplar illustrates that there is a dis-
tinction between judgments regarding whether a condition is a
mental disorder, and judgments regarding whether it should be
included in the nosology.
Paraphilic coercive disorder (PCD) was considered, but ultim-
ately rejected, for inclusion in DSM-5 (Stern, 2010). PCD illus-
trates issues at the boundary between the medical and legal
systems, and highlights disagreements about the nature of psycho-
pathology and moral responsibility. There is inconclusive evi-
dence of underlying psychobiological dysfunction or of harm to
the individual (other than that following legal transgression)
(Knight, 2010). However, more relevant here is the real risk of
the PCD diagnosis being misused in legal contexts to either
inappropriately exculpate a rapist, or to detain persons indefin-
itely, if deemed to be at risk of sexual reoffending (Wakefield,
2011). The debates surrounding PCD highlight how pragmatic
considerations inform decisions about nosology. Such considera-
tions include maintaining societal trust in the integrity of psychi-
atric diagnosis and protecting the reputation of the profession, as
well as anticipating potentially harmful consequences of including
certain constructs as disorders.
Importantly, as social mores change, so too may considera-
tions about the cost-benefit of including particular entities in
the nosology. Premenstrual dysphoric disorder (PMDD), for-
merly known as late luteal phase dysphoric disorder, is well
described in the psychiatric literature. There is clear evidence
that specific psychobiological mechanisms are altered in those
with this condition, and that those with this condition may bene-
fit from medical treatments (Epperson et al., 2012). Still, this
entity was not included in DSM-IV, as concerns were raised
that the diagnosis would impact negatively on women, confirming
stereotypes that they had less ability to fulfil professional obliga-
tions (Zachar & Kendler, 2015). In DSM-5, perhaps partly
because of advances in our understanding of and treatment of
PMDD, and perhaps partly because of continued advances in
gender parity, PMDD was included in the manual. Judgments
about the inclusion of entities in the nosology may need to
weigh up responsibilities to patients v. responsibilities to society
as a whole.
Discussion
Taken together, these exemplars may help shed light on key con-
ceptual issues involved in including a proposed entity in the
classification.
One set of conceptual issues surround the notion of ‘harm’.
Harm refers to suffering or disadvantage associated with a par-
ticular condition, and is operationalized with the ‘clinical criter-
ion’ of DSM-5 using the phrase ‘significant distress and/or
impairment’. It has often been emphasized, including by
DSM-5, that this criterion is ‘fuzzy’, and also that not all
distress/impairment points to a mental disorder. However, our
exemplars indicate a number of additional complexities.
First, decisions about the introduction of new entities into the
nosology need to balance the harm to the individual with harm to
society. This is seen in the discussion of PCD and PMDD. The
introduction of PCD has significant potential for societal harm,
and the proposal to introduce this disorder was rejected. While
there were concerns about such harm for PMDD, societal changes
have significantly mitigated these concerns, and the proposal to
introduce this disorder was accepted. Furthermore, putative
PCDs are relatively rare and PMDD relatively common, so the
possibility of clinical benefit to those affected is greater for the lat-
ter (Hartlage, Breaux, & Yonkers, 2014; Robinson & Ismail, 2015;
Thornton, 2010; Wollert, 2011). Second, there may be significant
debate about the extent to which harm is due to the failure of
society to accommodate differences. This is seen in debates
around the inclusion of homosexual and gender dysphoria in
the nosology. In the former case, exclusion was agreed upon,
while in the latter case inclusion was advocated.
While the concept of ‘harm’ is a useful one for defining mental
disorder, when new entities are proposed in the future, it will be
important to consider, for some of them, more sharply, the issue
of individual v. societal harm, as well as the issue of societal
accommodation. Notably, our exemplars seem to indicate that
profiles of harm may change over time as societies change.
Although this is seen in only a very small number of exemplars,
this means that we cannot provide future decision-makers with
6 Dan J. Stein et al.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291721001185
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 105.233.95.165, on 19 Apr 2021 at 14:54:59, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
algorithmic advice about what proposal to accept or reject across
the board. Just as the clinical criterion requires careful clinical
judgment, so in the case of these disorders, decisions will require
careful practical judgment, that weighs up a range of relevant
considerations.
The second set of conceptual issues is those concerning the
notion of ‘dysfunction’. In some medical disorders there is per-
suasive evidence of biological dysfunction (e.g. in progeria and
in schizophrenia, neurogenetic mechanisms are causally linked
to distressing and impairing symptoms). However, in many men-
tal conditions, causal mechanisms are poorly understood, and
psychobiological dysfunction is inferred on the basis of crude
markers such as the severity of symptoms and the extent of asso-
ciated distress and impairment (e.g. in mild cognitive impairment
and in social anxiety disorder). Furthermore, our exemplars point
to additional considerations.
In particular, in some cases of putative mental disorder, even
though there are symptoms, as well as associated distress and
impairment, there are still reasons to doubt the presence of under-
lying psychobiological dysfunction. First, the symptoms may sim-
ply reflect apparently normal processes, such as memory loss with
age, or bereavement symptoms after a loss. Second, the symptoms
may represent an understandable response to particular circum-
stances, other than those in Table 3, criterion C. Suicidal ideation,
for example, may be reasonable under certain circumstances.
Thus, judgments about dysfunction, again, require careful prac-
tical judgment, weighing up a range of relevant considerations.
While the concept of ‘dysfunction’ is a useful one for concep-
tualizing mental disorders, when new entities are proposed in the
future, it would be ideal to have more sharply defined indicators
of dysfunction. Symptom severity, excessiveness, and duration
may be helpful in indexing dysfunction (e.g. pointing to hyper-
sexuality, or obsessional jealousy), but they are rough indicators
that run the risk of relying on a statistical definition of dysfunc-
tion. At the same time, it is notable how rarely molecular evi-
dence, per se, is able to index dysfunction; crucially, biological
difference does not point to dysfunction.
The third set of conceptual issues relates to the type and extent
of data required to reach conclusions about harm and dysfunc-
tion. In our proposed DSM-5 definition of mental disorder, we
emphasized the importance of evidence for diagnostic validity
and clinical utility. Diagnostic validity is supported, in part, by
data that point to the involvement of specific etiological mechan-
isms; such data support assertions that psychobiological dysfunc-
tion is present and can be addressed by health interventions.
Clinical utility is supported, in part, by data indicating that clin-
ical assessment and intervention will be helpful; such data support
assertions that harm is present and can be diminished. These
issues are not listed in the DSM-5 text defining mental disorders,
but our exemplars suggest that they are useful considerations.
Thus, across different proposals for disorders, there have been
differences in the type and extent of data that support diagnostic
validity and clinical utility. This is apparent in discussions of
behavioral addictions, APS, and simple type schizophrenia. In
behavioral addictions, some entities (e.g. gambling) have a great
deal of data supporting diagnostic validity and clinical utility,
while others (e.g. gaming) have fewer supporting data. In the
case of simple type schizophrenia there are insufficient data to
demonstrate diagnostic validity, and in the case of APS, there
are insufficient data to demonstrate clinical utility.
It is notable that most discussions of the definition of mental
disorders focus on conceptual issues and are therefore quite
different from a data-oriented approach to the validation of
entities, once they are considered to be disorders. It may be useful
to incorporate explicitly the importance of a validation-oriented
approach into conceptual discussions. Some in the field expect
that once internet gaming gathers more high-quality validity
and utility data, it too will be accepted as a disorder. Our view
is that the field should recognize the potential importance of evi-
dence of diagnostic validity and clinical utility in the definition of
a mental disorder, and that future revisions further clarify the type
and extent of data needed to support such judgments.
In summary, this paper has taken an exemplar-based approach
to the question of defining mental disorders. We had hoped to
extract a set of practical guidelines that future nosologists could
draw on when discussing proposals for new entities. The concep-
tual issues that emerge from our exemplars are, however, complex,
indicating that any future proposal will need to be assessed on its
particular merits, using practical judgment. Nevertheless, several
proposals for the field emerged. First, while harm is useful for
defining mental disorder, some proposed entities may require
careful consideration of individual v. societal harm, as well as of
societal accommodation. Second, while dysfunction is useful for
conceptualizing mental disorders, the field would benefit from
developing more sharply defined indicators of dysfunction.
Third, it would be useful to incorporate evidence of diagnostic
validity and clinical utility into the definition of a mental disorder
and to further clarify the type and extent of data needed to sup-
port such judgments.
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